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Verificationism between Pragmatism and Logical Empiricism 
Massimo Ferrari
 
1. Lewis’s Pragmatic A Priori
1 In 1937 Otto Neurath claimed that in a country like the United States, “in which Peirce,
James, Dewey and others have created a general atmosphere that is empiricist in many
respects,”  the  philosophical  insights  of  the  Vienna  Circle  and  related  groups  were
friendly and welcome. “The very fertile American manner of thinking,” Neurath added,
“successfully  combines  with  the  European  in  this  field,  and  important  results  may
probably be expected from such cooperation” (Neurath 1983: 190). Some years before,
Charles Morris had stressed, for his part, that Pragmatism and Logical Empiricism “are
essentially complementary” so that  “much is  to be expected from a conscious cross-
fertilization  of  the  two  tendencies”  (Morris  1937:  23).  According  to  Morris,  a  new
scientific empiricism was in the making, thanks to a kind of pre-established harmony
between the Vienna Circle and American pragmatism. Thus, both Neurath and Morris
were in perfect  agreement  with a  view of  the relationship between Pragmatism and
Logical  Empiricism that would have until  recent time been recognized as the official
history of a successful “cross-fertilization.” New scholarship, however, has shown that, at
least for two main reasons, the story is more complicated than is usually assumed. On the
one hand, before the emigration of the Vienna Circle from Europe to the United States
during  the  1930s,  Logical  Empiricism  and  Pragmatism  inaugurated  a  very  fruitful
collaboration, and increased significant affinities (Ferrari 2017). On the other hand, today
it is no longer admissible to contend that a supposed “dogmatic” Logical Empiricism “was
driven by a much more liberal  Pragmatism to a liberal  turn,” profiting thereby – as
Neurath suggested – from the “very fertile” American way of thinking (see Limbeck-
Lilienau 2012: 108).
2 In order to shed new light on this very intricate network of conceptual and historical
relations, attempting a closer examination of the case study “Lewis and Schlick” seems to
be of some interest. To be sure, the general historical and biographical context of this
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fascinating history (though to be told in detail elsewhere) had been originated by the
relationship between Schlick and the Anglo-Saxon milieu since the end of  the 1920s.
Schlick’s stay as visiting professor at Stanford in 1929 and at Berkley in 1931/32, his
participation in the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy in Oxford in 1930, and
finally the lectures on Form and Content he delivered in London in 1932 testify to “a
bilateral (and intercontinental) exchange of ideas” between the Vienna Circle and the
philosophical communities both in Great Britain and the United States (Stadler 2003: 167;
Stadler 2007:  582).  Schlick was not the only one to give impulse to the international
dialogue within the scientific philosophy of that time, but he also played a very important
role, not least due to the publication of several articles in English in the last years of his
life.1 
3 In 1929, the same year as Schlick’s stay at Stanford, Lewis’s philosophical masterpiece
Mind and World Order saw the light. This profound, but hitherto over-neglected book was
the result of a research program devoted to a pragmatic theory of A priori. Lewis had
sketched the main lines of this original theory in 1923, when he overcame the first step of
his philosophical career through the influential A Survey of Symbolic Logic, first published
in 1918 and deeply inspired by his “friend and teacher” Josiah Royce (Lewis 1918: vi). The
brief essay A Pragmatic Theory of the A Priori and the more detailed contribution of 1926 on
The Pragmatic Element in Knowledge offer a clear account of Lewis’s major philosophical
project. More precisely, Lewis was engaged in framing a “conceptual pragmatism” which
represents  quite  an original  contribution to  both alternative  conceptions  of  A priori
elaborated by Ernst Cassirer and Arthur Pap (Stump 2011; Stump 2015: 94-101; Stump
2017),  and the debate  about  the “relativization of  A priori”  within the early  Logical
Empiricism (Mormann 2012: 113-4). Lewis’s very idea of “pragmatic A Priori,” as well as of
“conceptual pragmatism,” rests upon the articulation of a theory of knowledge in three
elements  (Calcaterra  2009).  First,  A  priori  are  only  the  logic-mathematical  concepts
established by definition,  without any reference to sense-qualities  or  things given in
experience (Lewis 1970: 244). They are nonetheless “principles of procedure”: namely,
their  principal  function  is  a  “pragmatic”  one,  as  well  as  prior  to  the  process  of
investigation (Lewis 1970: 232, 234). A priori signifies thus independent of experience,
“but precisely,” Lewis contended, “because it prescribes nothing to experience” (Lewis
1970:  231).  Second,  the  given  of  experience  is  a  totally  independent  element  from
thought,  purely belonging to experience as such.  The given is  in no way affected by
thought and in any case subsists in itself before perception or any form of relation to the
mind (Lewis 1970: 248). Finally, the interpretation of experience rests upon the activity of
mind and is  more than experience itself,  being that  “truth,”  as  Lewis  maintained in
genuine pragmatic spirit, “is made by mind” (Lewis 197: 240, 248-9). According to Lewis,
however, the active interpretation provided by mind is not rooted in a fixed system of a
priori categories as conceived by Kant (Lewis 1970: 241). This does not mean, though, that
knowledge would be possible without “a network of categories and definitive concepts”
exploring experience (Lewis 1970: 237). Pragmatism, in contrast, outlines a conception of
mind that fully recognizes the priority of “the act of interpretation with its practical
consequences”  (Lewis  1970:  240).  In  a  later  essay  of  1941,  Lewis  will  state  that  the
“emphasis  upon  relevance  to  some  active  intent”  represents  precisely the  point  of
difference between Pragmatism and Logical Positivism. While the former is more or less
interested in the sophisticated techniques of empirical testability (meaning here Rudolf
Carnap), the latter omits “largely or wholly” the activity of human mind, and conceives of
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experience essentially in the sense of physicalism, namely too far from the language of
everyday experience (Lewis 1970: 94, 103). 
4 Accordingly,  in his major work of 1929 Lewis endorsed a philosophical  point of  view
rooted  in  the  tradition  of  American  pragmatism,  and  in  particular  Peirce’s  thought,
though still largely dependent upon Kantian epistemology in a broad sense. According to
Sandra  B.  Rosenthal,  “the  work  is  strongly  and  consciously  Kantian  in  its  focus  on
‘categories,’  though as always with Lewis,  the Kantian schematic undergoes a radical
transformation” (Rosenthal 2007: 16). To be sure, this “transformation” represents the
core of Lewis’s philosophical enterprise and can be acknowledged as his most important
contribution to contemporary philosophy. One can even remark that Lewis anticipated,
to some extent, the later discussion on “conceptual schemes” that would, from the 1950s
on,  animate  analytical  philosophy (Beck 1953/54;  Beck 1968).  Similarly,  the  forward-
looking critique of the “myth of the given,” which would take a key role in philosophical
agendas only after Wilfried Sellar’s celebrated contribution of 1956, had already been
developed by Lewis, albeit within his own peculiar perspective, in Mind and World Order.2
In Lewis’s mind, at stake here is not the claim that the given can be altered or even
ignored by our thinking, but that empirical data is always in need of interpretation by
means of our thought (a typical Peircean point of view, as one can easily comprehend).3
Lewis unambiguously says: “We cannot describe any particular given as such because in
describing it, in whatever fashion, we qualify it by bringing it under some categories or
other, select from it, emphasize aspects of it, and relate it in particular and avoidable
ways.” (Lewis 1929: 52). The field of the given belongs therefore to a specific context.
Knowledge means going beyond the given, but this is possible only by using conceptual
schemes  delimiting,  in  Kantian terms,  the  “possible  experience,”  or,  in  a  pragmatist
sense, the workability of the schemes. The relationship between scheme and given makes
it possible to determine what the given properly is. In other words, knowing an object
implies the activity of mind and requires its “integration.” As Lewis very clearly argues:
“For the merely receptive and passive mind, there could be no objects and no world.”
(Lewis 1929: 137).
5 At the center of Lewis’s conceptual Pragmatism lies therefore the very idea of philosophy
as  inquiry  into  the  nature  both  of  A  priori  and  categories  we  use  in  framing  our
knowledge. And knowledge means for Lewis the equipment of all the concepts exhibiting
the  propriety  of  “common,  shareable  and  expressible  meaning”  (Lewis  1929:  80).
Mathematics offers, in this sense, the best illustration of a similar “body of truth which
may rise [both] from pure concepts” and logical relations having no reference to sense-
qualities of any sort (Lewis 1970: 244). According to Lewis W. Beck, Lewis once affirmed he
was a Kantian, but a Kantian – he paradoxically explained – “who disagrees with every
sentence of the Critique of Pure Reason” (Beck 1968: 273). There is no doubt, however, that
what is distinctive in Mind and World Order is exactly the rethinking of Kant’s theory of A
priori in a very unusual manner, though Lewis’s greatest philosophical debt was indeed to
Kant (Murphey 2006: 99). 
6 To begin with, Lewis conceives the Kantian a priori in a pragmatic and not in a synthetic
sense. More precisely, the very function of a priori consists of classifying and ordering
the empirical material, although the crucial point is rather that for Lewis the authentic
character of a priori resides in its analyticity: “The a priori is not a material truth, delimiting
or delineating the content of experience as such, but is definitive or analytic in its nature.” (Lewis
1929: 231). A priori is something valid or truth by definition, upon which the experience
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depends in so far as analytic rules or stipulations embrace the conditions enabling our
relationship to experience. By recognizing the analytical A priori as fundamental in order
to constitute experience,  Lewis proposes a sort of challenge to traditional Kantianism,
because analytical statements a priori become the condition of possibility of experience
in general. Lewis seems to be in no doubt over what concerns this crucial aspect: “The
naming, classifying, defining activity is at each step prior to the investigation. We cannot
even interrogate experience without a network of categories and definitive concepts.
Until  our  meanings  are  definite and our  classifications  are  fixed,  experience  cannot
conceivably determine anything.” (Lewis 1929: 259). To be further stressed here is that
Lewis refers to (intentional) “meanings” in the sense of “criteria of application” of verbal
expressions, determining in advance the “testable and sense-recognizable characters” of
field of application (Lewis 1946: 157).4
7 A second intervention on the Kantian A Priori in Lewis’s conceptual Pragmatism, on the
other hand, focuses on the treatment of the classical problem of categories. His main
issue consists  of  recognizing the set  of  categories we employ in our knowing with a
dynamic  character,  similarly  to  the  analogue  attempt  developed by  the  Neo-Kantian
Cassirer that Lewis once sympathetically quotes (Lewis 1929: 363*). According to Lewis’s
account, we are to work with a “list of categories” (as the young Peirce would have said),
including, e.g., substance, accident, cause, effect, thing, content, event, propriety, law and
so on. These relatively vague categories are, properly speaking, “guides to action” (Lewis
1929: 21), that is,  instruments whose validity is testified through the practice both of
knowledge and linguistic communication. Moreover, the very idea of a priori – which at
first glance “smacks of magic and superstitious nonsense,” as Lewis ironically remarks
(Lewis 1929: 22) – can be considered as something prior to experience, precisely as a
purpose is prior to the goal to be reached (Lewis 1929: 24). Hence, for Lewis, what is more
important is that categories are necessary in order to enable experience – namely to
make it possible – in a genuinely Kantian sense: “The world of experience is not given in
experience: it is constructed by thought from the data of sense.” (Lewis 1929: 29). And
Lewis goes on: “The categories are ways of dealing with what is given to the mind, and if
they had no practical consequences, the mind would never use them.” (Lewis 1929: 31).
“Practical consequences” also legitimate the validity of the categories; and in this sense
the Kantian deduction of categories is still acceptable, or more precisely it is acceptable in
the sense that both the practical use and success of conceptual frameworks determine the
possibility  of  experience,  without  any  postulation of  unique  “modes  of  intuition”  or
“fixed forms of thought” (Lewis 1929: 320). Nonetheless, to reject the “transcendental and
miraculous status” of categories as eternal structures of human Reason does not imply, in
Lewis’s mind, eliminating their function as rules finding an exemplification in the “very
wide range of heterogeneous sensory content” (Lewis 1929: 99-100). From this point of
view, the pragmatist Lewis acknowledges his own indebtedness to the Kantian legacy; or
one could affirm that “we must all  be pragmatists in the end,  not in the beginning”
(Lewis 1929: 267).
 
2. Schlick, Lewis and Verificationism
8 Bearing this  maxim in mind,  in the early 1930s Lewis contacted Schlick and Carnap,
making an effort in bridging the gap between Pragmatism and Logical Empiricism. The
first  important  upshot  of  this  intellectual  exchange  is  mirrored  in  Lewis’s  article
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“Experience  and  Meaning”  (published  in  1933  in  The  Philosophical  Review),  where  he
brought to attention the danger of solipsism he saw in Schlick’s and Carnap’s criterion of
verification through direct experience, dangerous because it is based on the subjective
experience lived by the Ego. For Lewis, by contrast, cognition is guided by “an element of
anticipation” foreshadowing the datum. Hence, verification indicates the potential for
“being verifiable,” a word connoting – like any word ending in “able” – possibility in
general, and in particular the conditions under which the verification can be projected
and obtained (for instance when we consider a sentence regarding the other side of the
moon).5 In a nutshell,  Lewis intended to rework the logical-positivistic  conception of
verification  by  pointing  out  that  “to  know  (empirically)  is  to  be  able  to  anticipate
correctly further possible experience” (Lewis 1970: 268). 
9 Lewis  also  recasts  the  concept of  experience  in  the  sense  of  a  kind  of  “activity,”
underlying thereby the main difference between Pragmatism and Logical  Empiricism.
“The pragmatic emphasis upon relevance to some active intent,” Lewis holds, “is largely
or wholly omitted in logical positivism” (Lewis 1970: 94). Note that by “logical positivism”
Lewis here means exclusively Carnap, who had, in Lewis’s eyes, excluded precisely what
was supposed to be at the heart of a pragmatic conception of meaning. This is understood
not only in the sense of what the logical positivists mean by “protocols” or “observation
sentences” over and against what the pragmatists mean by the “content of experience,”
but  also  in  the  sense  that  Carnap’s  logical  syntax overlooks  the  distinction between
linguistic meaning and empirical meaning, “which concerns the relation of expressions to
what may be given in experience” (Lewis 1970: 96-7). It is precisely at this point that
Schlick  enters  the  scene  through  an  extensive  answer  to  Lewis,  which  places  great
emphasis on the concept of verifiability. Before considering Schlick’s position in detail,
however, it is worth recalling that from the early days of his philosophical development
he had manifested a sharp disagreement with the pragmatist conception of truth and, in
particular, with James’s own. In his dissertation on The Nature of Truth in Modern Logic,
published in 1910, Schlick already deemed as false (or even “unscientific”) the pragmatist
theory of truth, because it confuses the essence of truth with both the criteria of its
verification and its practical consequences (Schlick 1979, vol. I: 67). Schlick found James’s
account of truth unacceptable for two main reasons: on the one hand, because while all
true judgments have to be verified, it does not follow, conversely, that all the judgments
that  are (or  can be)  verified are true;  on the other hand,  because James’s  definition
attributes to truth in general “a property uncharacteristic of it in either everyday or
scientific language, namely that of mutability” (Schlick 1979, vol. I: 64-5). Hence Schlick’s
claim that he differed “sharply from pragmatism” (Schlick 1979, vol. I: 88), maintaining
by contrast that truth is the “one-to-one coordination” of judgments with some “states-
of-affairs.” This insight would be at the center of Schlick’s main work too, i.e. the General
Theory of Knowledge from 1918, where he emphasizes once again his disagreement with
James’s Pragmatism, suggesting rather – as he already did in 1910 – that “the great merit”
of Pragmatism consists exactly of considering the “process of verification” as “the only
way of recognizing the univocal nature, and thus the truth, of the judgment” (Schlick
1979, vol. I: 96; Schlick 1974: 165). 
10 Twenty-five years after his youthful study on the concept of truth, Schlick would have the
occasion to reconsider his previous view on the pragmatist procedure of verification.
Needless to say, in the meantime the context had become quite different from at the time
of Schlick’s first writings. In the early 1930s Schlick was involved in the protocol sentence
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debate; he had become a long-time devoted admirer of Wittgenstein; and, last but not
least,  he  had  endorsed  a  new  conception  of  philosophy  as  an  activity  of  linguistic
clarification. Nonetheless, a subtle link to Pragmatism seems to re-emerge in his very
influential  paper  “Meaning and Verification,” which appeared under  the  auspices  of
Lewis himself in the July 1936 issue of The Philosophical Review. Actually, Schlick’s article
required careful preparation and was published not long after his tragic death. It can also
be considered as his philosophical testament, a kind of message in the bottle for further
developments in Logical Empiricism and analytic philosophy (see Schlick 2008: 703-7).
11 Interestingly  enough,  in  1936  Schlick  claimed  that  Lewis’s  remarks  on  verifiability
seemed to be in “perfect agreement” with Viennese Empiricism (Schlick 2008: 716). As a
convinced,  enthusiastic  follower  of  Wittgenstein’s  conception  of  meaning,  Schlick
maintained that the meaning of a proposition consists of “the method of its verification”
(Schlick 2008: 712). The core argument here is that verification means, exactly as Lewis
suggests, “possibility of verification,” that is “verifiability,” but not “verifiable here now”
or  “being  verified  now.”  In  Schlick’s  own  words:  “Verifiability  means  possibility  of
verification.” (Schlick 2008: 717-8, 720). Furthermore, it is quite crucial to bear in mind
that for Schlick the possibility of verification always means the logical possibility. The
empirical verification concerns the truth of a proposition, for instance its accordance
with the laws of nature, or lack thereof. By contrast, the meaning of a proposition, i.e. the
question about its sense, may be posed only in the framework of the logical possibility of
verification. Note that precisely this point was at stake in the November 1934 discussion
between Schlick and Carnap concerning the Lewis’ essay, to which Carnap also aimed to
respond.  For  Schlick  it  was  implausible  to  assume,  as  Carnap  did,  that  the  logical
possibility of verification could be in contrast with the laws of nature, because in that
case dismissing a natural  law would imply that natural  laws can be meaningless (RC
029-28-08). Meaningless propositions, by contrast, are, in Schlick’s opinion, the
propositions that represent logical impossibilities (Schlick 2008: 723; see also Friedl 2013:
103-4). A further consequence is thus that verifiability as logical possibility represents the
sufficient  and  necessary  condition  of  meaning,  showing  at  once  that  a  meaningful
problem can not be “insoluble in principle” (Schlick 2008: 726). And the very example
Schlick brings to one’s attention is again the question posed by Lewis about the other side
of the moon (Schlick 2008: 728). Accordingly, Schlick underlines that “it will be easy to
show that there is no serious divergence between the point of view of the pragmatist as
Professor Lewis conceives it and that of the Viennese Empiricist” (Schlick 2008: 716). 
12 In answering to Schlick’s proposal to discuss ”Experience and Meaning,” Lewis remarked,
in  a  letter  dated  December  14,  1934,  that  with  regard  to  verification  the  point  was
perhaps not  clear.  Lewis’s  doubt  was in particular  about  the solipsism vindicated by
Carnap but,  according  to  Lewis,  also  implicit  in  Schlick’s  own verificationism.  Lewis
wrote: “I have not intended to accuse the Vienna Circle of metaphysical solipsism; I have
meant  to  indicate  that,  for  you,  the  issue  between  metaphysical  solipsism  and  any
metaphysical  alternative is  meaningless;  and I  have meant  to  take exception to that
conclusion.” (Schlick Nachlaß, Inv. 107/Lewis – 1). Actually, Lewis was convinced that to
ascribe to the act of knowing a solipsistic character was “no more strange or fantastic
than Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception” (Lewis 1970: 262). For his part, Schlick
too was not satisfied with Carnap’s “methodological solipsism” and in his response to
Lewis  he  defined  Carnap’s  terminological  choice  “unfortunate”  (Schlick  2008:  735).
Schlick stressed that, on a closer look, Carnap’s formulation would reveal not a kind of
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solipsism, but rather “a method of building concepts” (Schlick 2008: 735). And this move
provided Schlick with the opportunity of bringing up for discussion the mistake affecting
any manner  of  considering the  mind as  something inside  the  body:  the  mistake,  he
explained, that characterizes “the idealistic fallacy which leads to solipsism,” and whose
danger Lewis had rightly denounced (Schlick 2008: 737).6
13 Schlick’s  late  convergence  with  Lewis,  along  with  his  warm  interest  in
Percy W. Bridgman’s The Logic of Modern Physics (Schlick 2008: 187-91, 714), thus testifies
to an increasing dialogue between Logical Empiricism and American Pragmatism, even
before the dissolution of the European scientific community. They represent – as Alan W.
Richardson  has  rightly  underlined  –  “kindred  rather  than  opposing  projects”
(Richardson 2003: 1). From a philosophical point of view, the question is whether a careful
(re)examination of the Schlick and Lewis case can suggest a possible third way beyond the
parting of the ways Schlick had initially seen at the time of the first reception of what he
had called in 1910 “unscientific” Pragmatism in Germany. It seems plausible to suggest
that  Lewis’s  conceptual  pragmatism  and  Schlick’s  late  conception  of  meaning  and
verification  found  a  significant  convergence  point  in  verificationism,  although  their
respective  origins  remain  doubtless  very  different  and,  to  some  extent,  mutually
extraneous.7 It  is  not  by  accident,  we  may  add,  that  Lewis  played  a  leading  role  in
rediscovering in the 1930s the father of  pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce,  thereby
posing the premises for further developments of the movement, as later exemplified, for
instance, by Willard V. O. Quine. In 1981 Quine himself suggested that Peirce’s famous
pragmatic maxim could be considered as the first attempt to elaborate a verifiability
theory of meaning similar to that shared by the Vienna Circle in its final period (Quine
1981: 30). Moreover, one can suggest that Peirce’s late philosophy offered a sophisticated
account of what verification means, inasmuch as Peirce never believed in the “myth” of
definite testability of empirical sentences (Chauviré 2001). In this respect Peirce
anticipated  the  “liberalization”  of  empiricism  later  pursued  by  Carnap,  though  his
conception of experience was at any rate “much richer” – according to Hookway – than
the Viennese verificationism was able to formulate (Hookway 2013: 33). 
14 The later realignment of Pragmatism along Pierce’s positions is of crucial importance to
understand Lewis’ own views regarding Logical Empiricism. In vindicating Peirce’s self-
identification  with  a  kind  of  metaphysics  Lewis  aimed  to  stress  how  metaphysical
questions, that is more general questions not to be tested by empirical verification, can
play a crucial role in orienting inescapable and more general discussions about both the
nature of knowledge and science. As Lewis argued in 1941: “There are questions with
respect to which some decision must be made in the interest of any theory of science or
of knowledge in general, or of the character of experience in general, with respect to
which  any  limited  set  of  experiments  or  observations,  such  as  those  of  the  natural
sciences,  is  either  unnecessary  or  futile  or  both.”  (Lewis  1970:  106).  The  Logical
Positivists,  Lewis  contended,  have totally  excluded a  similar  function of  metaphysics
conceived,  we  might  say,  as  a  kind of  general  framework within  which it  would  be
possible  to  treat  philosophical  questions  as  a  class  of  statements  that  surely  have
meaning, but are not verifiable “under human conditions, and do not belong to the field
of science” (Lewis 1970: 107). Was this insight compatible with Schlick’s philosophical
rejection of metaphysics and with the linguistic turn he had advocated since the early
1930s? This question leads to a third issue, unfortunately to date little considered by
scholarship. 
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 3. Verificationism and Ethical Values
15 Following Lewis’s own suggestions, a final point must thus be stressed. In his article on
“Logical  Positivism  and  Pragmatism”  Lewis  pointed  out  an  aspect  that  very  well
summarizes what is at stake here. “It is with respect to problems of evaluation and of
ethics,” Lewis suggested, “that the contrast between logical positivism and pragmatism is
strongest […] For the pragmatist there can be no final division between ‘normative’ and
‘descriptive’.” (Lewis 1970: 106, 112). As Lewis had written to Schlick in 1934, “the line
between the empirical  and verifiable and the metaphysical  and meaningless” seemed
drawn “a little too sharply” when we consider “the objectivity of judgments of values.”
This  is  just  the  point  we  need  to  emphasize  in  order  to  properly  account  for  the
discussion between Schlick and Lewis about verificationism. According to the standard
view of the Vienna Circle, moral judgments and ethical norms in general do not belong to
the sphere of  cognitive meanings,  and consequently,  unlike meaningful  propositions,
they are unconcerned with the value of truth or falsity. This point of view is maintained
by Carnap, since The Logical Structure of the World (1928) and even more precisely since his
subsequent  contributions  both on the  principle  of  verification and on the  refusal  of
metaphysics.8 The core thesis of Carnap’s not cognitive ethics is presented in a short
article  of  1934,  where  the  domain  of  practical  decision  and  moral  values  is  sharply
distinguished  from  scientific  knowledge  as  well  as  from  verifiable  statements.  “The
scientific consideration,” Carnap argues, “does not determine the goal, but only the way
leading to the goal that has been established [by our will].” (Carnap 1934: 259). Hence, in
Carnap’s view, an unbridgeable division subsists between the factual dimension and the
normative sphere. 
16 In 1936 Lewis, by contrast, makes it immediately clear that the problem consists just of
establishing if it is actually possible to confine normative statements in the field of the
meaningless or the “emotive” language (Lewis 1970:  152).  In sketching an alternative
solution, Lewis proposes to take into account a different conception of language from the
formal-syntactical structure Carnap had privileged. Though Lewis was not influenced by
the “linguistic turn” opened by Wittegenstein’s Tractatus, he seems here very sensitive to
the different uses of language (both in everyday life and in the scientific context). The use
he considered excessively neglected by the Vienna Circle is “expressive use,” entailing
the capability of expressing living experience, feelings, esthetic or moral appreciations,
intuitions, imagination. Since that domain of human life seems, at first sight, to be quite
different from the field of judgment, cognition, knowledge, and verification, a strange
ambiguity – Lewis believes – arises when investigating the question of normativity and
language  use.  Usually,  and  in  Vienna  in  particular,  expressive  meanings  have  been
neglected, assuming that the class of cognitive statements includes only verifiable, true
or false propositions belonging to meaningful language. According to Lewis, this narrow
categorization  simply  represents  great  “confusion,”  that  we  should  address  as  the
consequence  of  an  unjustified  criterion  of  verification  “denying  the  possibility  of
objective meaning in the case of value-predications” (Lewis 1970: 157). A similar failure
depends,  moreover,  on  another  failure  concerning  the  conception  of  objectivity.
Objectivity  (in  the  authentic  pragmatist  sense) presupposes and  involves  at  once
intersubjectivity, namely the possibility of communicating meanings beyond the risk –
not avoided by Carnap – of legitimating a sort of solipsism. To sum up, for Lewis the
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“reasonable argument” unfortunately not shared by Carnap leads to the conclusion that
“there  is  no  law against  defining  intersubjective  value-meanings  to  a  community  of
behavior” (Lewis 1970: 158). As a consequence, it sounds just very “reasonable” to hold
that “it would be highly paradoxical to say that such expressive statements are not true
or false” (Lewis 1970: 155).
17 The challenge Lewis posed to the Vienna Circle was surely of the greatest significance.
There is a further important difference that has typically been overlooked. For his part,
Schlick  was indeed  engaged  in  creating  a  scientific  ethics  free  of  metaphysics,
questioning nevertheless the not cognitive status of ethics claimed by other followers of
Logical Empiricism, as in the very influential case, for instance, of Ayer’s emotive theory
of values (Ayer 1946: 102-20). Schlick’s naturalistic ethics was elaborated in his Problems of
Ethics, published in 1930 and also quoted by Lewis in the article we examined above. At
first  glance,  Schlick’s  work  seems  to  be  perfectly  imbued  with  the  linguistic  turn
inaugurated by Wittgenstein, as is easy to see by reading the programmatic declaration of
the preface, where Schlick emphasizes that philosophy should not to be intended as a
science or “a system of propositions,” but rather as an activity. Not unlike the conception
of philosophy that Schlick had already outlined in his seminal article concerning the
turning point in philosophy (Schlick 2008: 213-22), the task of philosophy ought to be
defined as making clear the sense of scientific propositions or discovering their meaning.
Properly speaking, this is in no way a scientific enterprise, but only an activity which
“constitutes the essence of philosophy; there are no philosophical propositions, but only
philosophical acts” (Schlick 1939: xiii). Nonetheless, in his ethical inquiries Schlick aims
to deliver a contribution to the “psychological knowledge” of human moral behavior, the
foundation  of  ethics  being  a  psychological  one:  ethics  is,  any  commitment  to
Wittgenstein’s  insights  about  ethics  and  values  notwithstanding,  a  “factual  science”
(Schlick 1939: 20-2).9 
18 That  being  said,  it  is  worth  noticing  that  ethics  as  psychological  science  or  –  put
otherwise – as a cognitive and naturalistic discipline implies the overcoming of the “great
division,” namely the division between factual  sciences and normative sciences.10 For
Schlick this kind of opposition is “fundamentally false” (Schlick 1939: 17) and he insists
that  philosophers  ought  to  conceive  of  ethics  as  a  science  of  human  reality.  As  a
consequence it appears perfectly right to dismiss Kantian ethics and, more generally, the
“pride of those philosophers who hold the questions of ethics to be the most noble and
elevated of questions just because they do not refer to the common is but concern the
pure ought (das reine Sein-sollende)” (Schlick 1939: 21). In evident opposition to Carnap,
Schlick suggests that ethics requests an explanation (Erklärung) both of moral judgment
and of moral conduct:  because the “essence of moral” is explicable only through the
exploration of the causes of human actions, i.e. of their order and regularity, the proper
method of ethics is a psychological one. In this sense ethics is characterized not by its
supposed independence from experience, but rather by its seeking of truth (Schlick 1939:
26-30). 
19 Ultimately,  Schlick’s  approach  to  ethical  problems  involves  the  opposition  to  the
traditional views of both values and ethics of values that represented a widespread trend
within the German philosophy at that time (in this connection one could mention, for
instance, figures such as Heinrich Rickert or Max Scheler). According to Schlick, contrary
to  the  wrong conception of  values  as  “absolute”  and totally  independent  from both
psychological  experience  and  psychological  process  of  evaluation,  the  principle  of
Lewis and Schlick
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XI-1 | 2019
9
verification can be applied to the field of values too. Values are not valid “in themselves”
(an sich), but are the result of a psychological genesis, so that they are rooted in empirical
state of affairs and, what is more important, they can be verified in light of some given
psychological  facts.  Because of  the psychological  foundation of  values and evaluating
acts, it seems fully justified to find “the verification of a proposition concerning value (
Wertaussage) in the occurrence of  a definite experience.” The criterion of verification
regarding moral values lies therefore in finding – as Schlick says – the “corresponding
experience,”  that  is  “the  feeling  of  pleasure”  they  awake.  This  feeling  completely
exhausts “the essence of value” (Schlick 1939: 105). 
20 Let  us  turn  now  to  Lewis.  The  critical  attitude  he  takes toward  Carnap  cannot  be
considered as valid in the case of Schlick either. To begin with, Lewis is in accordance
with  Schlick  regarding  the  empirical  status  of  any  sort  of  evaluation,  which can be
verified and, accordingly, tested as truth or false. As Lewis will suggest, “evaluations are a
form of empirical knowledge, not fundamentally different in what determines their truth
or  falsity,  and  what  determines  their  validity  or  justification,  from  other  kinds  of
empirical knowledge” (Lewis 1946: 365). In spite of his deep commitment to Kant’s ethics,
Lewis remains a veritable pragmatist in considering human actions in the light of the
consequences we can foresee, so that, in doing so, we are dealing with “one of the most
essential  of  cognitive capacities” (ibid.).  This  places  him at  quite some distance from
Schlick. In framing this conceptual space for ethics and value judgments, Lewis attempts
to  seriously  take  into  account  the  problem of  the  objectivity  of  the  ethical  sphere,
inasmuch as this sphere belongs to inter-subjectivity, to human communication, and to a
project of  social  life universally desirable as rich and rationally oriented by common
goals.  In this context Lewis stresses again and again how it is important to correctly
define  the  role  of  the  “final  test  of  judgment,”  which  consists  –  in  few words  –  of
prediction and verification (Lewis 1970: 173-4). 
21 There is also something else in common between Lewis and Schlick, albeit surely not
between Lewis  and Carnap.  Lewis  and Schlick  share  the  basic  assumption that  both
ethical  values  and  judgments  (or  propositions)  exhibit  a  cognitive  content,  being
therefore verifiable in the broader sense of verificationism as it was discussed during the
1930s in Vienna as well as at Harvard. By contrast, in comparing Lewis’s and Schlick’s
concept of experience one can conclude that Schlick’s was patently narrower than Lewis’.
As Sandra Rosenthal has pointed out, for Lewis “means and ends are inextricably fused in
the  holistic  nature  of  ongoing experience  in  its  temporal  flow,”  whereas  “his  ethics
integrates the importance of consequences and the role of imperatives rooted in our
natural capacities as temporal, goal-oriented, problem-solving beings” (Rosenthal 2007:
139, 151). Whether or not starting from such a conception of experience would have made
it possible to enlarge and enrich the insights of the Vienna Circle in the period of the
“cross-fertilization”  between  Logical  Empiricism  and  Pragmatism  is  a  question
demanding not only historical, but also, and especially, systematic considerations. But
this is, of course, a task for further research.
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NOTES
1. These articles are now collected in Volume 6 of Schlick’s works (Schlick 2008). 
2. Zarebski 2017 has very well shown that Lewis’s epistemology is immune to Sellar’s criticism of
the “myth of the given.”
3. On this issue see in particular Kegley (2017: 20).
4. As Rosenthal (2007: 41) points out: “Lewis emphatically rejects as epistemologically untenable
the  nominalist  conception  that  individuals  are  the  first  knowables  and  that  individuals  are
primitively determinable by ostensive reference. It is only by reference to intentional meaning as
criterion in mind by which one applies or refuses to apply a term that denotation is possible, for
we must first have criteria for determining what experiences are relevant.”
5. This example had been already formulated by Schlick in his article on positivism and realism
(1932), which Lewis likewise had in mind (Schlick 2008: 332).
6. See furthermore (Schlick 2008: 743):  “Solipsism is nonsense, because its starting-point, the
egocentric predicament, is meaningless.” 
7. Olen 2017 suggests that Schlick’s and Lewis’s point of views are patently quite different and
they do not allow for a convincing claim on the convergence between Logical Empiricism and
Pragmatism. Olen still seems to consider Schlick and Carnap as the common targets of Lewis’s
criticism, thereby overlooking the fact that Carnap’s formal language surely represents a very
particular  declination  of  verificationism.  Lewis’s  skeptical  attitude  toward  Carnap  does  not
overlap with his doubts toward Schlick. See especially what Lewis remarks on in the late article
Logical  Positivism  and  Pragmatism by  referring  to  Carnap’s  Philosophy  and  Logical  Syntax:  “The
logical-positivistic  theory  [i.e.  Carnap]  fails  to  distinguish  between  syntactic  or  linguistic
meaning  –  a  relation  of  one  verbal  expression  to  other  verbal  expressions  –  and  empirical
meaning,  which  concerns  the  relation  of  expressions  to  what  may  be  given  in  experience.”
(Lewis  1970:  96).  This  last  statement  (“the  relation  of  expressions  to  what  may  be  given  in
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experience”)  is  just  the  point  of  Schlick’s  unfortunately  only  sketched  conception  of
Konstatierungen (Friedl 2013: 179-244). 
8. To tell the truth, in 1928 Carnap was not so clear in questioning the not cognitive status of
values (see Carnap 2003: 233-4; and Mormann 2006). In any case, Lewis was very well acquainted
with Carnap’s major work, which he had carefully studied (Murphey 2005: 221).
9. It is worth noticing that in his article of 1932 The Future of Philosophy Schlick underlines the
scientific characters of ethics (and esthetics) in these terms: “Ethics and esthetics certainly do
not yet possess sufficiently clear concepts; most of their work is still devoted to clarifying them,
and therefore it may justly be called philosophical. But in the future they will, of course, become
a part of the great system of the sciences.” (Schlick 2008: 388). 
10. On Schlick’s ethics see Stern-Gillet 1983, Bonnet 2001, Fonnesu (2006: 240-3), Siegetsleitner
(2014: 265-331) and Ferrari 2018.
ABSTRACTS
This paper explores the philosophical relationship between Clarence Irving Lewis and Moritz
Schlick, questioning their understanding of verificationism. At stake is not only the crucial point
of the possibility of verifying statements regarding, for instance, the other side of the moon, but
also  the  proper  status  of  ethical  values  in  opposition  to,  or  in  connection  with,  scientific
propositions grounded in experience. This latter aspect can better explain how both Lewis and
Schlick understand the notion of experience in general, posing the conceptual framework within
which Pragmatism and Logical Empiricism established a dialogue in the 1930s but still worthy of
closer inquiry.
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